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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
KEVIN H. KELLY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 48724-2021
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-20-27173
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Kevin Kelly pled guilty to burglary and two counts of grand theft, the district court
imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years, with ten years fixed. Mr. Kelly appeals. He
argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Kelly committed five counts of
burglary, five counts of grand theft, and one count of possession of a controlled substance.
(R., pp.9–10, 38–41 (amended complaint).) According to the presentence investigation report
(PSI), these allegations arose from a series of burglaries and thefts of residential and commercial
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properties. (PSI,1 p.2.) Mr. Kelly waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate judge bound
him over to district court. (R., pp.43, 44–47.) The State charged him by information with these
eleven offenses. (R., pp.48–51.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Kelly pled guilty to one count of burglary and two
counts of grand theft. (Tr., p.13, L.12–p.20, L.21; see also R., p.69.) At sentencing, the State
recommended a sentence of ten years fixed for burglary and ten years indeterminate for each
count of grand theft, all to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of thirty years. (Tr., p.25,
Ls.2–10.) Mr. Kelly requested the district court sentence him to two or three years fixed,
followed by twelve years indeterminate. (Tr., p.38, Ls.19–22.) The district court sentenced
Mr. Kelly to ten years fixed for burglary and fourteen years indeterminate for each count of
grand theft, to be served concurrently to each other, but consecutive to the burglary sentence.
(Tr., p.44, Ls.14–22.) Thus, the total aggregate sentence was twenty-four years, with ten years
fixed.
Mr. Kelly timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.73–
75, 79–80.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Kelly to twenty-four years, with
ten years fixed, for burglary and two counts of grand theft?
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 579-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Kelly To Twenty-Four Years,
With Ten Years Fixed, For Burglary And Two Counts Of Grand Theft
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Kelly’s sentences do not exceed the statutory
maximums. See I.C. § 18-1403 (one-year minimum, ten-year maximum for burglary); I.C. § 182408 (one-year minimum, fourteen-year maximum for grand theft). Accordingly, to show the
sentences imposed were unreasonable, Mr. Kelly “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). “The
decision of whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” State v. Helms, 130 Idaho 32, 35 (Ct. App. 1997); see also I.C. §18308.
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In this case, Mr. Kelly asserts the district court did not exercise reason and therefore
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts.
Specifically, he contends the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of
imprisonment in light of the mitigating factors, including his drug relapse and substance abuse
issues, poor health, and acceptance of responsibility and remorse.
Mr. Kelly’s substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his behavior,
and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court should give
“proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing [the]
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal
conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.” State v.
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here,

Mr. Kelly relapsed on

methamphetamine after being sober for twenty-seven years. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1–5; see also PSI, p.31
(letter from Mr. Kelly’s sister).) He started using methamphetamine once he retired from
concrete work. (PSI, pp.4, 9.) Up until his arrest, he was using methamphetamine regularly for
seven or eight months. (PSI, p.8.) But, prior to this relapse, Mr. Kelly “was a law-abiding citizen
for many years.” (PSI, p.14.) He now wanted to remain drug-free, and he recognized that he
needed treatment. (PSI, pp.8, 22.) He also understood that the instant offenses were caused, in
part, by his drug use and his failure to use his relapse prevention tools. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Kelly’s
relapse and substance abuse issues support more lenient sentences.
Further, Mr. Kelly’s poor health stands in favor of mitigation. See State v. Cobell, 148
Idaho 349, 356 (Ct. App. 2009) (acknowledging district court’s consideration of defendant’s old
age and health problems as mitigating factors); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 636 (Ct. App.
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2001) (district court considered defendant’s poor health as a basis for not following State’s
sentencing recommendation). Mr. Kelly was diagnosed with diabetes and neuropathy. (PSI, p.6.)
He also had a bad back. (PSI, p.6.) Due to these medical issues, he had difficulty walking and
keeping his balance. (PSI, p.6.) In the past, he was treated for hepatitis and cirrhosis. (PSI, p.6.)
He explained that his health had “gotten bad the past few years.” (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Kelly’s sister
speculated that he turned to drugs again due to his poor health. (PSI, p.31.) The district court
should have given more weight to this mitigating factor.
Finally, Mr. Kelly expressed regret and remorse and accepted responsibility for the
offenses. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In the PSI, Mr. Kelly stated that he felt “terrible
guilt” for his actions and who he became after his relapse. (PSI, p.14.) He explained, “I
apologize to the court, my family, and the community for my crimes and not being a father to my
son and daughter. I keep thinking I could have put a stop to all this if I wasn’t doing drugs. I
haven’t been in trouble with the law in 27 years.” (PSI, p.14.) At sentencing, he apologized to the
burglary victim. (Tr., p.39, Ls.6–9.) He told the district court that he was “not a bad person” and
he made these poor decisions once he started using drugs again. (Tr., p.39, Ls.10–14.)
Mr. Kelly’s goals were to take care of his wife, stay sober, and help others with their sobriety.
(PSI, p.13.) These statements of acceptance, remorse, and regret justified lesser sentences.
In sum, Mr. Kelly maintains the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences. He contends proper consideration of the mitigating
factors in his case supported more lenient sentences.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Kelly respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate. In
the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2021.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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DEBORAH A. BAIL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-Service: dcbailde@adaweb.net
JOSEPH L. ELLSWORTH
ELLSWORTH KALLAS & DEFRANCO PLLC
E-Service: jle@greyhawklaw.com
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
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